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The  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  and  Supervision  established  minimum  capital 
requirements for banks in their 1988 Capital Accord. This capital regulation was 
adopted  for  European  Union  banks  at  the  beginning  of  1993.  After  the 
implementation, a widespread concern emerged about the possible negative impact 
that  higher  capital  requirements  could  exert  on  the  level  of  economic  activity, 
especially on bank lending. This paper investigates the impact of the Basel Accord 
on bank deposits and loans for eight European countries. We follow the approach 
taken by Peek and Rosengren (1995a) and test for the regulatory effect in a panel 
structure with about 2500 individual bank balance sheets for the years 1993-1995. 
We find that changes in deposits are positively correlated with changes in capital. 
Lower-capitalized banks show a stronger response to a change in capital than their 
higher-capitalized competitors. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 
the implementation of minimum capital requirements had a negative effect on the 
supply of bank loans. 
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1.  Introduction 
Banking sector stability is a central requirement for stable economic development. 
Moreover, banks play an important role in the global economy, and are the first 
category of institutions to be subject to internationally coordinated capital regulation. 
The Basel Accord of 1988 intended to strengthen the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system and to reduce competitive inequalities between banks. 
The  potential  macroeconomic  effects  of  these  regulations  have  received  renewed 
interest after the decision to introduce an enhanced regulatory framework, laid down 
in Basel II, which has been agreed on in June 2004. 
The Basel Accord of 1988 prescribes common minimum capital requirements for 
banks operating internationally in the G-10 countries and became effective at the end 
of 1992. More precisely, it fixes the minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets 
to 8 percent.
1 Thereby the regulators intended to lower total bank risk by lowering 
the risk taking of individual banks. Around 100 countries world-wide apply now this 
new capital regulation.
2 In European Union (EU) countries, the Basel Accord was 
implemented at the beginning of 1993 not only for banks operating internationally 
but for the banking sector as a whole. 
A potential negative side effect of the introduction of the Basel Accord may have 
been a reduction in total bank lending as banks adjusted their risk structure. This 
effect may have been of special relevance for economies heavily depending on bank-
intermediated credit, such as those of Europe. This contention is the main focus of 
the empirical analysis conducted in this paper. 
To make sure that the new Accord was more than mere regulatory window-dressing, 
we have to verify that the implementation of the minimum capital requirements of 
the Basel Accord actually resulted in an increase in national capital requirements. 
Germany
3, for example, had strict capital regulation long before the introduction of 
                                                            
1   Bank assets are allocated into four different categories associated with risk weights between 0-
100  percent,  according  to  their  perceived  default  risk.  Assets  with  zero  default  risk,  e.g., 
government  securities,  receive  0%  risk  weight,  assets  with  low  default  risk,  e.g.,  interbank 
deposits, get 20 % risk weight, residential mortgage loans are considered to be medium-risk 
assets and have 50% weight, while all other loans to the private sector are classified in the 
highest  risk  category,  which  requires  a  100  %  weight.  See  for  further  details  BIS  (1988), 
Annexes 2 and 3. 
2   BIS (1999). 
3   We checked these issues mainly for the German case, since the German banking market is the 
most important credit market in Europe and German banks dominate our sample.   2 
the  Basel  Accord.  A  priori,  it  was  not  even  clear  to  the  national  supervisory 
institution  whether  the  Basel  Accord  would  strengthen  the  capital  regulation  in 
Germany or not, because two countervailing effects had to be considered. The Basel 
Accord increased the required capital-to-assets ratio, but also expanded the range of 
allowable capital components.
4 We can infer from reports on the banking sector by 
the Bundesbank
5 that the average capital-to-assets ratio, calculated on the basis of 
Basel rules, was approaching 7% at the end of 1991. Thus, German banks still had to 
increase their risk-weighted capital ratios by at least one percentage point in the year 
before the Basel Accord came into effect. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) find that 
Italian banks strongly increased their capital ratios before the implementation of the 
Basel Accord. These two specific country observations support our assessment that 
the new capital requirements in 1993 induced banks to improve their capital ratios. 
Due to problems of asymmetric information in financial markets, banks may find it 
difficult to raise new capital by issuing new shares at a price deemed reasonable by 
shareholders and managers.
6 This is true especially in times when profits are low, 
and retained earnings are not available as an alternative source of increasing bank 
capital. To raise its capital-to-assets ratio, a bank can then either shrink its asset side 
or substitute assets with high risk weights under the Basel Accord for assets with low 
risk weights. Since loans to the private sector have high risk weights under the Basel 
Accord, both adjustments are likely to entail contraction in the supply of loans. If all 
banks in the economy try to achieve an increase in the capital ratio at the same time, 
this mechanism potentially leads to macroeconomic consequences. Bank lending to 
the private sector falls, financing restrictions for firms become tighter, and aggregate 
demand falls as a result. If the incipient cyclical downturn leads to a worsening of the 
performance of existing loans in the economy, this process may be amplified, as loan 
losses in the banking sector reduce bank equity and low earnings prevent a new 
internal build-up of equity capital. 
This potential negative impact of higher capital requirements on bank lending has 
been investigated extensively for the US
7. In contrast, a comprehensive study for 
Europe is still missing. This paper aims at filling this gap. Sine the data situation 
                                                            
4   See Bundesbank (1988). 
5   See Bundesbank (1993), p.56. 
6   See Myers and Majluf (1984). 
7   See Berger and Udell (1994), Brinkmann and Horwitz (1995), Hancock et al. (1995), Hancock 
and Wilcox (1998), Peek and Rosengren (1995a) and Peek and Rosengren (1995b).   3 
does not allow us to identify directly the regulatory effect, we try to measure this 
effect indirectly. We do this by investigating the impact of the 1988 Basle Accord on 
bank deposits and loans for eight European countries. The goal of our empirical 
analysis is to assess whether the introduction of Basel I was accompanied by a loan 
contraction in Europe. This loan supply effect can then – in line with the literature – 
be interpreted as a result of new binding regulation. 
We follow the empirical approach taken by Peek and Rosengren (1995a) and run 
parallel regressions for bank deposits and loans providing a rich perspective of the 
evolution of bank behavior around the period of the regulatory change. We use an 
unbalanced panel of 4400 individual bank balance sheets for the years from 1993 to 
1995. We find that changes in deposits and loans were positively correlated with 
changes in capital. This suggests that loan supply was determined by the availability 
of capital. Lower-capitalized banks show a stronger response to a change in capital 
than  their  higher-capitalized  competitors.  This  evidence  is  consistent  with  the 
hypothesis that the implementation of minimum capital requirements had a negative 
effect on the supply of bank loans. Further robustness checks show that our results 
are  neither  affected  by  the  sample  structure  nor  by  differences  in  average 
capitalization across countries. In addition, we can present comparative regressions 
for the periods 1989-1992 and 1996-2002 indicating that the loan supply effects were 
particularly strong in the three years after the implementation of the Basel Accord. In 
sum,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  introduction  of  Basel  I  had  negative 
macroeconomic consequences in Europe. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  The  next  section  reviews  the  theoretical  and 
empirical  background.  In  section  3  the  data  are  introduced  and  discussed,  while 
section 4 presents our estimation strategy and results. The last section concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical and Empirical background 
Berger  et  al.  (1995)  argue  that  a  bank’s  capital-to-assets  ratio  is  determined  by 
market and regulatory requirements.
8 Berger et al. (1995, p.395) define “a bank’s 
market capital requirement as the capital ratio that maximizes the value of the bank 
in the absence of regulatory capital requirements, but in the presence of the rest of 
                                                            
8   The line of reasoning in this section is mainly based on Berger et al. (1995).   4 
the  regulatory  structure  that  protects  the  safety  and  soundness  of  banks.”  They 
distinguish between five potential determinants of the market capital requirement: 
taxes and costs of financial distress, transaction costs and asymmetric information, 
and the regulatory safety net. 
If the tax system favors debt over equity financing, owners have an incentive to fund 
a firm almost completely with debt. Simultaneously, any increase in the leverage 
brings about a rise in the probability of an insolvency crisis. Any insolvency crisis 
implies substantial costs of financial distress e.g. cost of bankruptcy procedures and 
conflicts  of  interest  between  different  stakeholders  of  a  firm.  These  two 
countervailing effects have to be taken into account by the firm when it chooses its 
optimal capital ratio. 
Furthermore, transactions costs of raising funds form external sources, particularly 
the costs of issuing equity, may be substantial and lead to a preference for debt 
financing. 
Asymmetric  information  problems  shape also  the  optimal  capital  structure  of  the 
bank. Banks acquire information in the loan screening and contracting process, and 
then  expand  this  information  over  time  by  monitoring  the  borrower’s  loan 
repayments and deposit activity. Consequently, banks produce substantial amounts of 
private information about their loan customers. This creates a range of asymmetric 
information  problems  between  incumbent  shareholders  and  potential,  new 
shareholders, depositors and other creditors, and between shareholders and manages. 
The capital-to-assets ratio can be used as a signaling device. A high capital ratio can 
indicate favorable private information, but if it is less costly for a “good” bank to 
signal  good  performance  through  increased  leverage  than  for  a  “bad”  bank,  then 
banks could also show a lower capital ratio when they expect better performance in 
the  future.  Asymmetric  information  may  also  lead  to  agency  conflicts  between 
shareholders  and  creditors.  This  conflict  will  be  more  pronounced  in  times  of 
financial distress, when shareholders prefer actions maximizing the value of their 
own claims but not necessarily the value of all claims on the bank e.g. shifting wealth 
from creditors to shareholders through the implementation of a riskier investment 
strategy. Since creditors anticipate such expropriation behavior, they will demand 
compensation in the form of higher interest rates on debt. As a reaction, banks may 
optimally increase their capital ratios to assure creditors that interests of shareholders   5 
and creditors are closely aligned. Asymmetric information is also the foundation for 
conflicts  of  interest  between  shareholders  and  managers,  e.g.  when  shareholders 
cannot effectively monitor manager’s actions. Higher debt can in this case solve the 
principal  agent  problem  and  implements  better  incentives  for  the  managers.  In 
summary, the net effect of asymmetric information problems on the optimal capital 
ratio is unclear, because shareholders have to trade off the benefits of higher capital 
ratios in solving the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors with the 
negative  impact  of  higher  capital  ratios  on  the  principal  agent  conflict  between 
shareholders and managers. 
Berger  et  al.  (1995)  suggest  that  the  existence  of  a  regulatory  safety  net  for  the 
banking  sector  has  a  strong  effect  on  the  capital  requirements  requested  by  the 
market. The safety net consists of all government actions designed to enhance safety 
and soundness of the banking system other than the regulation and enforcement of 
capital requirements. Deposit insurance and the lender of last resort function of the 
central  bank  are  examples  for  such  government  actions.  The  safety  net  reduces 
market  capital  requirements  and  the  incentives  to  bank  creditors  to  monitor  risk 
profiles. This reasoning explains why banks which are covered by a more extensive 
safety net than most other industries generally have lower capital ratios than firms in 
any other industry. Berger et al. (1995) find confirming evidence for this argument 
by examining historical data on capital ratios for the last 150 years in the U.S. The 
introduction of new components of the regulatory safety net has always led to further 
decreases in bank capital ratios.
9 
Let  us  now  turn  to  regulatory  requirements.  Banking  regulation  enforces  capital 
requirements for two reasons. First, if deposit insurance is at least partially run by 
government  agencies,  or  the  central  bank  acts  as  a  lender  of  last  resort,  the 
government is effectively one of the largest uninsured creditors of the banking sector. 
This exposes the government to the same costs of financial distress and expropriation 
of  value  as  other  creditors.  Governments  impose  capital  requirements  to  protect 
themselves  against  this  risk.  Moreover,  regulators  may  also  be  concerned  with 
systemic risk. The failure of a sufficiently large number of banks could set off a 
chain  reaction  that  might  damage  financial  stability.  Regulators  impose  capital 
requirements  on  banks  to  strengthen  the  soundness  and  stability  of  the  banking 
system to avoid systemic crisis. 
                                                            
9   See Bundesbank (1976) and Holtfrerich (1981) for similar historical observations for Germany.   6 
Although we have already argued above, that the introduction of the Basel minimum 
capital  requirements  caused  an  increase  in  regulatory  requirements,  this  assertion 
does  not  necessarily  imply  that  regulatory  capital  requirements  affected  bank 
behavior.  Regulatory  capital  requirements  only  matter  to  the  extent  that  they 
effectively constrain a significant portion of the banking sector causing an increase in 
capital  ratios  or  otherwise  affecting  the  behavior  of  these  banks  beyond  market 
capital requirements. Berger et al. (1995, p. 418) define, “that a regulatory capital 
requirement is binding if the capital ratio that maximizes the bank’s value in the 
presence of regulatory capital requirements is greater than the bank’s market capital 
requirement.” 
Theoretically, the regulatory constraint could be binding for a number of reasons. 
Examples  for  these  are  among  various  others:  Deposit  insurance,  which  renders 
deposits to be the cheapest source of finance (Repullo and Suarez (2004)), markets 
do not include the benefits of banking sector stability into their optimization problem 
(Estrella (2004)), or capital which cannot be used as signaling device (Hakenes and 
Schnabel (2005)). 
Empirically  it  is  difficult  to  assess  whether  the  regulatory  constraint  is  binding 
because banks have strong incentives to hold a capital buffer beyond the regulatory 
capital minimum. A capital buffer allows the bank to exploit unexpected profitable 
investment opportunities and to cushion the effects of unexpected negative shocks. 
The higher the regulatory penalty for falling below the minimum requirement and the 
higher the transaction costs of raising equity quickly, the higher is the capital buffer 
held by banks. This means, that even if we observe that all banks in an economy 
have  substantial  excess  capital,  bank  behavior  can  still  be  constrained  by  the 
regulatory requirement. A majority of empirical papers, which analyze bank behavior 
in response to changes in capital regulation, simply assume that the regulatory capital 
ratios are binding.
10 One exception is the paper by Wall and Peterson (1995) who test 
whether large bank holding companies in the US were affected by the regulatory 
changes  of  the  early  1990s.  Their  results  suggest  that  the  regulatory  regime  was 
binding in most cases. For Europe, there exists one comparable study for Spain by 
Barrios and Blanco (2003) who implement the same estimation strategy as Wall and 
Peterson (1995). They find for Spanish banks that a substantial number of banks 
                                                            
10   Among others: Barajas et al. (2004), Brinkmann and Horwitz (1995), Chiuri et al. (2002), Ediz et 
al. (1998), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), Hancock and Wilcox (1998), Peek and Rosengren 
(1995a), Peek and Rosengren (1995b), Rime (2001), Van Roy (2003).   7 
belong  to  the  “regulatory”  model  and  that  the  probability  of  belonging  to  the 
“regulatory model” increases with lower observed capital ratios. 
As mentioned above, there is evidence for Germany and Italy that banks increased 
substantially their capital ratios before the implementation of the Basel Accord. We 
do not have evidence that market capital requirements have risen substantially in the 
year  1992,  so  given  the  evidence  of  these  three  countries,  we  assume  that  the 
regulation was indeed binding. 
3.  Data 
3.1  Data sources 
We use individual bank data stemming from BankScope.
 It contains yearly balance 
sheets and profit and loss data for individual banks in a large number of countries. 
We  retrieved  data  for  the  years  1987  to  2003  for  banks  operating  in  Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
11 
Our sample is restricted to financial institutions providing credit to the private sector, 
such as commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, mortgage banks and 
medium  and  long  term  credit  banks.  Investment  banks  and  alike  were  excluded. 
Table 1 gives the number of banks available by country in the BankScope database. 
 
Country  Number of banks 
Belgium  121 
Denmark  219 
France  522 
Germany  2674 
Italy  993 
Netherlands  80 
Spain  271 
UK  292 
All countries  5172 
Table 1: Number of financial institutions which potentially provide credit  to the private 
sector in the BankScope sample 
 
                                                            
11   The BankScope is a commercially distributed database, which is maintained by the companies 
Bureau van Dijk and Fitch IBCA. Each issue covers up to ten years of data, therefore we use the 
January 1997 and the March 2004 issue to cover the period 1987-2003.   8 
BankScope extends its coverage of the banking population every year; as a result our 
panel is unbalanced with the number of observations varying across banks.
12 The 
database offers a choice between consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheets. 
Since  the  Basel  Accord  is  applied  to  banks  on  a  consolidated  basis
13,  we  use 
consolidated balance sheets whenever available, and unconsolidated balance sheets 
otherwise. 
The database presents balance sheet data in a “global format” with more general 
balance sheet categories, which assures comparability across countries. Total assets 
are subdivided in four categories: Loans, other earning assets, fixed assets and non-
earning assets. The first two positions sum up to total earning assets. Other earning 
assets include bond and security holdings. Total liabilities and equity include as the 
most important component customer and short-term funding, which comprises data 
for demand, savings, and time deposits. Other funding includes long-term borrowing, 
subordinated debt, and hybrid capital. Furthermore, liabilities encompass other non-
interest bearing funding, loan loss reserves, and other reserves. Finally, equity is 
reported. For some banks also the total capital ratio
14, the so called Basel ratio, can 
be  obtained.  The  profit  and  loss  statements  provide  us  with  data  on  net  interest 
revenue and other operating income. 
Bank mergers could potentially bias our results. Although we do not perform an 
explicit  merger  treatment,  we  check  whether  our  results  change  when  we  drop 
observations which show “extreme” total asset growth rates, since these most likely 
result from mergers.
15 We find that leaving out such observations does not change 
our results. 
Before the data is used for estimation we clean the data set. We delete observations, 
which  show  negative  values  for  balance  sheet  positions,  e.g.,  negative  loans  and 
deposits.  Furthermore  we  consider  observations  for  variables  used  for  estimation 
below the 5
th percentile and above the 95
th percentile to be an outlier and drop them. 
After the cleaning procedure the variables were approximately normally distributed. 
                                                            
12   BankScope claims to cover at least 90 percent of total banking assets in each country. For more 
information on the coverage of the estimation sample see section on data description. 
13   Consolidation refers to including subsidiaries’ balance sheets into the parent company. See Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), p.3. 
14   The total capital ratio equals the sum of tier1 and tier2 capital over risk-weighted assets. 
15   We define a growth rate of total assets to be “extreme” when the observation is above the 99
th 
percentile of the distribution of growth rates in the sample used for estimation.   9 
In the empirical analysis we also control for general economic factors as suggested 
also by Chiuri et al. (2002). We include annual, country-specific macroeconomic 
data for interest rates, GDP and exchange rates. As interest rates we use deposit, 
lending, and money market rates. As an exchange rate we employ the exchange rate 
of the respective country’s currency vis-à-vis the US dollar. All macroeconomic data 
are taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics or the OECD Economic 
Outlook. 
 
3.2  Data description 
Table 2 contains information on the composition of the effective sample by country 
and year.
16  
Country/Year  1993  1994  1995 
Belgium  16  32  32 
Denmark  37  36  53 
France  124  159  157 
Germany  433  1145  1236 
Italy  149  152  170 
Netherlands  16  16  19 
Spain  51  80  87 
United Kingdom  57  77  72 
Total number of banks  883  1697  1826 
Table 2: Number of banks by year and country in the effective sample 
 
The largest group of banks in the sample is German banks with much over 1000 
banks; the smallest banking populations included are those of the Netherlands and 
Belgium with only about 20-30 banks. The total number of banks considered in the 
analysis almost doubles between 1993 and 1994, which reflects that the compilation 
of  the  database  was  still  ongoing  in  1993.  Thereafter  the  number  of  banks  only 
increases slightly. 
The  specific  cross-country  composition  of  our  sample  might  affect  the  empirical 
results,  although  we  control  for  this  problem  as  accurately  as  possible  in  the 
regression  analysis  by  using  country  specific  macroeconomic  data  series  and  by 
correcting for bank specific fixed effects and time effects. 
                                                            
16   We mean by effective sample, all observations which are effectively used for the estimation of 
the basic regression results.    10
Table  3  gives  an  overview  of  how  representative  the  effective  sample  is  for  the 
countries  considered  and  for  the  sample  overall.  We  add  up  all  individual  bank 
balance  sheet  totals  by  country  and  year  which  are  in  our  effective  sample  and 
compare  this  sum  to  the  aggregate  end-year  balance  sheet  total  of  “all  banks”
17 
published by the OECD (2002) report on bank profitability. 
 
Country/Year  1993  1994  1995 
Belgium  2.84  5.71  5.37 
Denmark  4.88  12.39  19.58 
France  9.56  13.86  13.64 
Germany  20.81  34.12  33.40 
Italy  15.38  17.84  21.75 
Netherlands  5.31  6.72  7.17 
Spain  22.19  31.29  35.62 
United Kingdom  20.75  24.66  22.40 
All countries  15.50  23.03  23.92 
Table 3: Coverage of effective sample in percent
18  
Source: Own calculations and OECD (2002) 
 
To gain further insight whether the introduction of the Basel I capital requirements 
potentially resulted in a retrenchment of credit provision by banks we first show the 
percentage of banks in our sample that experienced an asset contraction in the sample 
period.  Second,  we  give  an  overview  on  the  development  of  relevant  banking 
variables by country and year. Table 4 shows the percentage of banks whose balance 
sheet total has shrunk in comparison to the previous year by country and year. In the 
whole sample, about one eighth of banks face such an asset contraction in 1993, 
about 10 % of banks in 1994, the percentage falls to about 8% in 1995. In Germany, 
only a small percentage of banks have a negative total assets growth in the sample 
period. The banks in Belgium, France and the Netherlands are also relatively mildly 
affected  by  asset  contraction  with  percentages  always  below  25%.  The  highest 
percentage of banks with asset contraction can be found in Spain for the year 1993, 
when 67% of banks show negative growth of total assets. Banks in Spain appear to 
                                                            
17   The precise classification of “all banks” by the OECD remains unclear, but we think that the 
group of banks considered should be roughly comparable to the banks we retrieved from the 
BankScope database. 
18   Coverage is defined as cumulated total assets by country and year to end-year balance sheet total 
of all banks in the respective country.   11
be most affected by asset contraction in the first year of the sample; Italian banks in 
1994. Great Britain is the country with the highest percentage of banks with asset 
reduction at the end of the sample period. While in 1993 a lower percentage of banks 
appear to be affected by asset contraction (with the exception of Spain) with respect 
to  the  two  following  years,  in  1994  the  percentage  of  banks  losing  assets  is 
increasing in most countries. 
 
Country/Year  1993  1994  1995 
Belgium  6.25  21.88  25.00 
Denmark  5.41  36.11  18.87 
France  11.29  14.47  9.55 
Germany  3.00  2.18  1.78 
Italy  28.86  55.92  28.82 
Netherlands  6.25  12.50  10.53 
Spain  66.67  11.25  4.60 
UK  5.26  24.68  45.83 
All countries  12.57  10.78  7.83 
Table 4: Percentage of banks with asset contraction by country and year 
 
Table 5 provides an overview of the dynamics of relevant banking variables around 
the period of regulatory change. We report by country the percentage changes in total 
assets, loans, deposits, and equity occurring in 1992 to 1995. We show additionally 
the inflation rate and real GDP growth to ensure comparability and to detect real 
macroeconomic effects. The table also shows the evolution of capitalization, which is 
defined as equity over total assets. The growth rates in the table were computed for 
the sample used for estimation in Section 4.4 and are unweighted averages. At a first 
glance, in seven out of eight countries the capitalization of banks appears to remain 
on  the  level  of  1993  (France,  Germany,  Italy)  or  has  risen  only  slightly  by  0.5 
percentage points (Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom) following the 
change in regulation. One exception is Belgium, where the banks increased their 
capital-to-assets ratio by almost two percentage points. So the first impression is that 
the implementation of the 1988 Basel Accord did not lead to an increase in average 
capital-to-assets ratios. In most countries, total assets and deposits had decreasing 
growth rates in the years following the introduction of the new capital requirements. 
For loan growth the picture is less clear, but one explanation could be that banks 
tried to shelter their loans from external effects. When the banks show lower growth   12
rates in total assets but almost stable growth rates in loans, these banks had to accept 
lower growth rates in other asset categories, e.g. bond and security holdings. 
 
Country /Year  1993 1994  1995 
Belgium     
capitalization  5.90 7.10  7.83 
total asset growth  10.47 6.25  7.08 
loan growth  7.49 6.66  7.01 
deposit growth  10.72 2.74  7.52 
equity growth  4.68 8.19  8.69 
inflation  2.77 2.39  1.42 
real GDP growth  -0.95 3.20  2.40 
Denmark     
capitalization  11.71 11.86  12.11 
total asset growth  11.80 0.97  7.04 
loan growth  1.39 5.65  8.06 
deposit growth  11.36 0.77  5.29 
equity growth  13.63 6.97  15.73 
inflation  1.27 1.98  2.15 
real GDP growth  0.02 5.28  2.75 
France     
capitalization  6.42 6.39  6.32 
total asset growth  6.56 3.59  8.64 
loan growth  3.20 3.94  5.47 
deposit growth  7.80 4.55  7.72 
equity growth  10.36 7.18  9.33 
inflation  2.01 1.76  1.73 
real GDP growth  -0.90 1.80  1.85 
Germany     
capitalization  4.55 4.42  4.62 
total asset growth  12.57 8.59  7.74 
loan growth  10.23 11.70  8.87 
deposit growth  11.04 5.81  5.32 
equity growth  12.80 10.25  9.27 
inflation  4.48 2.72  1.73 
real GDP growth  -1.11 2.32  1.70 
Italy     
capitalization  10.16 10.15  10.22 
total asset growth  2.11 -0.96  3.63 
loan growth  4.56 4.18  8.41 
deposit growth  10.23 -0.95  2.70 
equity growth  7.41 3.91  3.61 
inflation  4.46 4.05  5.26 
real GDP growth  -0.91 2.18  2.87 
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Country /Year  1993  1994  1995 
Netherlands       
capitalization  6.13  6.46  6.81 
total asset growth  11.84  4.89  10.56 
loan growth  8.47  8.26  12.62 
deposit growth  11.83  2.72  10.83 
equity growth  9.82  6.11  8.90 
inflation  2.58  2.83  1.94 
real GDP growth  0.57  3.13  2.33 
Spain       
capitalization  7.11  7.02  7.54 
total asset growth  -3.65  8.14  11.96 
loan growth  -3.15  8.38  11.74 
deposit growth  -3.97  9.38  11.76 
equity growth  1.46  6.52  12.20 
inflation  4.59  4.71  4.71 
real GDP growth  -1.22  2.23  2.69 
UK       
capitalization  6.92  7.39  7.40 
total asset growth  10.68  4.25  1.44 
loan growth  9.21  4.02  8.89 
deposit growth  10.52  5.07  0.74 
equity growth  14.68  7.91  3.58 
inflation  1.61  2.44  3.41 
real GDP growth  2.50  4.55  2.87 
Table 5: Unweighted average capitalization, total asset growth, loan growth, and deposit 
and equity growth by country and year for banks in the effective sample; CPI-inflation and 
real GDP growth by country and year 
 
Spanish  banks  faced  even  negative  nominal  growth  rates  in  1993,  banks  in  the 
United Kingdom are affected more strongly at the end of the sample period. Italian 
banks experienced even negative real growth rates for all categories in more than half 
of the sample period. It is apparent from the averages that in most countries the 
growth rates of total assets decreased in the years after the introduction of the new 
capital  regulation,  but  the  patterns  differ  by  country.  The  application  of  a  panel 
analysis, which allows for different fixed effects for each bank, and the inclusion of 
macroeconomic control variables, which relate to each country
19, should properly 
control  for  the  different  sources  of  heterogeneity  and  detect  the  existence  of 
significant regularities. 
 
                                                            
19   We assume that banks were affected by the macroeconomic conditions in their country of origin.   14
Country /Year  1993  1994  1995 
Belgium  5%  0.0290  5%  0.0356  5%  0.0380 
   25%  0.0368  25%  0.0494  25%  0.0486 
   50%  0.0523  50%  0.0597  50%  0.0646 
   75%  0.0628  75%  0.0929  75%  0.0957 
   95%  0.1182  95%  0.1406  95%  0.1742 
Denmark  5%  0.0617  5%  0.0593  5%  0.0665 
   25%  0.1011  25%  0.0987  25%  0.0922 
   50%  0.1088  50%  0.1147  50%  0.1199 
   75%  0.1366  75%  0.1371  75%  0.1476 
   95%  0.1735  95%  0.1822  95%  0.1802 
France  5%  0.0324  5%  0.0328  5%  0.0315 
   25%  0.0449  25%  0.0435  25%  0.0445 
   50%  0.0552  50%  0.0547  50%  0.0554 
   75%  0.0706  75%  0.0683  75%  0.0693 
   95%  0.1276  95%  0.1188  95%  0.1157 
Germany  5%  0.0327  5%  0.0318  5%  0.0334 
   25%  0.0376  25%  0.0376  25%  0.0391 
   50%  0.0428  50%  0.0423  50%  0.0438 
   75%  0.0482  75%  0.0480  75%  0.0493 
   95%  0.0705  95%  0.0610  95%  0.0638 
Italy  5%  0.0551  5%  0.0556  5%  0.0582 
   25%  0.0731  25%  0.0778  25%  0.0736 
   50%  0.0912  50%  0.0997  50%  0.0987 
   75%  0.1151  75%  0.1226  75%  0.1252 
   95%  0.1426  95%  0.1567  95%  0.1603 
Netherlands  5%  0.0304  5%  0.0300  5%  0.0295 
   25%  0.0412  25%  0.0333  25%  0.0505 
   50%  0.0602  50%  0.0612  50%  0.0615 
   75%  0.0754  75%  0.0716  75%  0.0789 
   95%  0.1377  95%  0.0955  95%  0.1413 
Spain  5%  0.0381  5%  0.0410  5%  0.0457 
   25%  0.0530  25%  0.0529  25%  0.0546 
   50%  0.0636  50%  0.0660  50%  0.0645 
   75%  0.0878  75%  0.0860  75%  0.0870 
   95%  0.1102  95%  0.1190  95%  0.1293 
United Kingdom  5%  0.0387  5%  0.0406  5%  0.0426 
   25%  0.0558  25%  0.0578  25%  0.0552 
   50%  0.0637  50%  0.0670  50%  0.0665 
   75%  0.0721  75%  0.0806  75%  0.0804 
   95%  0.1234  95%  0.1214  95%  0.1414 
Table 6: Percentiles of the distribution of capitalization in the effective sample 
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From Table 5 we conclude that the average capitalization of banks in each country 
does  not  change  very  much  in  the  sample  period.  Besides  the  average,  the 
distribution of capital across banks plays an important role, since a high variation in 
capitalization levels across banks facilitates the detection of heterogeneous effects of 
regulation. In Table 6 we present the percentiles of the distribution of capitalization 







The differences in capital-to-assets ratios across banks is quite substantial for most of 
the countries and the dispersion, the difference between the values of 95
th and the 5
th 
percentiles, ranges from 6.5 to 13.5 percentage points across countries. The German 
banks  in  the  sample  show  a  much  smaller  variation  in  capitalization  levels.  The 
dispersion increases in the sample period for banks in Belgium, Italy, Spain and the 
United  Kingdom,  decreases  for  banks  in  France.  The  dispersion  remains  almost 
stable for banks in Denmark and Germany and shows a strong variation for Dutch 
banks. The relatively large dispersion on capitalization levels at the banks in our 
estimation panel let us suspect that the implementation of the Basel Accord could 
have  had  substantial  heterogeneous  effects  on  banks  depending  on  the  level  of 
capitalization. 
 
4.  Empirical results 
4.1  Estimation strategy 
To analyze how the increase in capital requirements by the 1988 Basel Accord might 
have affected the behavior of European banks, we base our empirical analysis on an 
extension of the framework by Peek and Rosengren (1995a).
20 Peek and Rosengren 
(1995a) derive their estimation strategy from a simple bank balance sheet model in 
which  banks  operate  on  less  than  perfectly  competitive  markets  for  loans  and 
deposits. Banks take in deposits and extend loans to maximize their profits, taking 
into account a required capital-to-assets ratio set by capital regulation. The model 
shows that the effects of changes in capital on deposits and loans differ between 
constrained and unconstrained banks. Furthermore it allows to separate loan demand 
from loan supply effects. For the unconstrained bank, a reduction in capital will be 
                                                            
20   The framework has also been used by Chiuri et al. (2002) to analyze the macroeconomic impact 
of bank capital requirements in emerging economies.   16
offset  by  an  increase  in  its  deposits,  and  a  shrinkage  of  loans,  since  the  bank 
increases its deposits to replace at least partially the capital loss, in order to not forgo 
too many profitable loans. The behavior of constrained banks is very different, as 
their reaction possibilities are more limited due to the binding capital constraint. A 
reduction in capital will reduce deposits to meet the binding constraint. So in the case 
of  a  loan  supply  shock,  we  will  expect  deposits  and  loans  to  react  in  the  same 
direction as capital. The model also illustrates that the effects of a loan demand shock 
differ across constrained versus unconstrained banks. In the unconstrained case, a 
decrease  in  loan  demand  causes  both  deposits  and  loans  to  decrease.  In  the 
constrained case, neither loans nor deposits decrease. Hence the relative effects on 
constrained and unconstrained banks of an adverse shock to loan demand are just the 
opposite of those for an adverse shock to capital. 
In  particular,  capital  constraints  at  the  banks  included  in  our  sample  may  have 
resulted from the introduction of higher required capital-to-assets ratios by the 1988 
Basel  Accord.  Following  Gambacorta  and  Mistrulli  (2004),  an  increase  in  the 
regulatory capital ratio itself can be seen as a negative capital shock, because banks 
find  themselves  in  a  position  with  less  capital  than  desired  and  will  have  to 
restructure  their  balance  sheets.  If  this  hypothesis  is  correct,  the  introduction  of 
higher capital requirements will cause the contraction of liabilities and assets to be 
greater, the lower the capitalization of the bank. If, however, decreases in assets and 
liabilities  of  banks  during  the  years  after  the  introduction  of  the  regulatory 
framework are solely due to decreased loan demand, the degree of contraction should 
be greatest for banks not constrained by capital regulation. As long as banks cannot 
fully shelter their loan supply from decreases in deposits by adjusting their security 
holdings, decreases in deposits will feed into decreases in loan supply. The first goal 
of the estimation is thus to assess whether there was a loan supply effect present in 
Europe. The supply effect can then – in line with the literature – be interpreted to 
result from binding regulation. 
While the model provides predictions for the effects of a change in capital on both 
sides  of  the  balance  sheet,  Peek  and  Rosengren  (1995a)  argue  that  a  focus  on 
estimating  equations  for  the  change  in  deposits  rather  than  the  change  in  loans 
reduces the data problems associated with the change in loans. These are difficult to 
control for, since the change in a bank’s outstanding loans reflects more than just the 
bank’s lending activity. Particularly the treatment of loan write-offs can reduce the   17
growth in the quantity of loans outstanding without a corresponding reduction in new 
lending.  
We believe that both for loans and deposits, it is quite difficult to separate demand 
from  supply  effects.  We  try  to  control  for  loan  demand  and  deposit  supply  by 
including variables which represent general economic conditions of the country of 
origin,  since  we  could  not  obtain  bank  specific  loan  demand  or  deposit  supply 
proxies.  
We  will  run  parallel  regressions  for  bank  deposits  and  loans  to  improve  on  the 
robustness of the results but also to provide a richer perspective on the evolution of 
bank behavior around the period of regulatory change. 
In general there are different options how to measure the effect of a newly introduced 
capital regulation. The announcement date and then the implementation date of the 
new regulation are important for the measurement of any regulatory effect. Barajas et 
al. (2004) analyze banking data before and after the announcement of the adoption of 
the Basel Accord and cannot find announcement effects on capital ratios and lending 
behavior  in  the  different  regions  of  the  world.  We  follow  them  and  use  the 
implementation year 1993 as the relevant point in time for our analysis on European 
banks.
21  Further,  we  suppose  that  the  effect  of  the  introduction  will  be  only 
transitory. After a reasonable period of time the banking sector will have adjusted the 
capital ratios to the new higher levels. But on the other side, we believe that we 
cannot capture the introduction impact in the same year, since the adjustment of the 
capital ratio is costly, so that the effects will be spread also over the following years. 
Therefore, we use as estimation period the years from 1993-1995. 
But also the ‘intensity’ of the new capital regulation will matter. Ideally one could 
use a direct measure of the regulatory pressure as in Peek and Rosengren (1995b), 
Aggarwal  and  Jacques  (1998)  or  Gambacorta  and  Mistrulli  (2004).  They  have 
explicit  data  on  each  individual  bank  whether  and  for  how  long  regulatory 
enforcement actions took place at each institution at their disposal. But for most 
countries there is no explicit enforcement scheme and data on internal measures of 
supervisory institutions are not available. Since in our case no direct measure is at 
hand,  we  have  to  rely  on  an  indirect  measurement  of  the  regulatory  effect.  The 
literature discusses several aspects how to measure the so-called regulatory pressure, 
                                                            
21   See also for the discussion of adoption and implementation date Barajas et al. (2004), p. 36.   18
either the level of capitalization or excess capital-to assets-ratio matter, while also the 
exact  definitions  of  the  numerator  (capital)  and  the  denominator  (assets)  of  the 
capitalization measures play a role. 
Bank behavior is constrained by regulatory pressure once the bank falls close to the 
minimum capital requirement. Peek and Rosengren (1995a) suggest using the level 
of bank’s capitalization itself as a proxy for the constraint resulting from regulatory 
pressure. Estrella et al. (2000) also find that the simple capital-to-assets ratio predicts 
bank failure as well as more complex risk-weighted ratios over one- or two-period 
horizons. 
Other authors such as Rime (2001) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) argue that 
the  excess  capital-to-assets  ratio  can  better  control  for  the  riskiness  of  banks’ 
portfolios. The excess capital is thereby defined as the capital which is held above 
the  required  capital  by  regulation.  Unfortunately,  in  our  sample  only  41  banks 
publish the quantity of regulatory capital held, so we cannot perform our estimations 
with this measure. 
Regarding the capitalization measure, another potential problem is the definition of 
capital, the numerator of the ratio. Peek and Rosengren (1995a) and particularly the 
BIS (1988) come to the conclusion that using only equity is advantageous because “it 
is  the  key  element  of  capital  and  the  only  common  to  all  banking  systems. 
Furthermore, it is wholly visible in the published accounts and is the basis on which 
most market judgment of capital adequacy are made, and it has crucial bearing on 
profit margins and a bank’s ability to compete”
22. However, capital according to the 
Basel Accord of 1988 includes equity and supplementary capital like subordinated 
debt, hybrid capital and general loan loss reserves, so it is useful also to use an 
extended capital measure in our estimations. 
With respect to the denominator of the capital-to-assets ratio one can choose between 
total  assets  or  risk-weighted  assets.  Ideally  one  should  use  the  risk-weighted 
regulatory  capital  ratio  as  the  correct  measure  for  capitalization  for  estimation, 
because  the  Basel  minimum  capital  requirement  is  based  on  this  total  regulatory 
capital ratio. Unfortunately, only a small fraction of banks publish these Basel ratios, 
so that BankScope provides this variable for about 260 banks out of 2246 banks in 
our effective sample. 
                                                            
22   See BIS (1988), p.3-4.   19
We estimate the following regressions proposed in Peek and Rosengren (1995a) and 
Chiuri et al. (2002), in which we include the capitalization measures (CM): 
 
dDijt /TAijt-1=  a1 CMijt-1+ a2 dKijt / TAijt-1 + a3 CMijt-1*(dKijt / TAijt-1) +  
a4  log  TAijt-1  +  a5  liquidityijt-1+  a6  fee  incomeijt  +  
a7 ∆ log GDPjt + a8 ∆ interest ratejt + a9 ∆ exchange 
ratejt + tt + mi + eijt  (1) 
     
dLijt /TAijt-1=  a1 CMijt-1+ a2 dKijt / TAijt-1 + a3 CMijt-1*(dKijt / TAijt-1) + 
a4  log  TAijt-1  +  a5  liquidityijt-1  +  a6  fee  incomeijt  +  
a7 ∆ log GDPjt + a8 ∆ interest ratejt + a9 ∆ exchange 
ratejt + tt + mi + eijt   (2) 
 
Where i={1,…, N} is the index for the N banks, t={1,…, T} refers to the respective 
year, and j={1,…, J} denotes the country where the bank is situated. We include time 
dummies tt and estimate a fixed effect model, where mi  is the bank specific effect. In 
order to choose between a random or fixed effect specification the Hausman test is 
used. The Hausman test rejects in each case the random effects specification. We 
therefore estimate the fixed effect model.
23 
The dependent variable is the annual change in deposits D of bank i normalized by 
beginning of period total assets TA of bank i.
24 CMijt-1 is the bank’s beginning of 
period capitalization measure. CM is chosen to capture the degree to which a bank 
faces regulatory pressure, a high CM stands for a high-capitalized bank. Since banks 
with low capitalization are under pressure to improve their capital ratio, we expect 
that  poorly  capitalized  institutions  show  slower  growth  in  liabilities  than  well-
capitalized institutions, other things equal. We expect a positive sign for a1. 
Following the discussion above, we define three different capitalization measures 
(CM). The first measure is the simple equity to total assets ratio, which is also used 
                                                            
23   We are not particularly interested in country specific effects; therefore we do not include a set of 
country dummies. Nevertheless from an econometric point of view any country-specific effect 
will be perfectly controlled for by including bank individual effects in the estimation. 
24   The  normalization  by  the  beginning  of  period  total  assets  should  reduce  potential 
heteroscedasticity problems in the error term. See also Peek and Rosengren (1995a).   20
by Peek and Rosengren (1995a). The second capitalization measure, the extended 
capitalization, is measured by the ratio of equity plus other capital components to 
total assets. We add subordinated debt and hybrid capital to core equity whenever the 
data is available. If data on the supplementary components is missing, the extended 
capitalization equals the equity-to-total assets ratio. The Basel Accord also allows 
general loan loss reserves
25 to be used as other capital components, but BankScope 
does not specify whether the data on loan loss reserves refer to the Basel definition or 
not,  therefore  we  have  not  considered  them  when  calculating  the  extended 
capitalization. The third and last measure represents the “Basel ratio”, which equals 
to  the  total  regulatory  capital  over  risk-weighted  assets.  All  three  ratios  are 
significantly and highly correlated.
26 
Equity capital can change because of retained earnings or losses and by issuing new 
equity. The change in equity capital dKijt/ TAijt-1 is normalized by the beginning of 
period total assets. We expect that increases in capital will result in increases of 
deposits and loans, a2 is positive. To assess whether higher capitalized banks react 
differently from lower capitalized banks, the sign of the coefficient a3 is decisive. 
The model implies that higher-capitalized institutions that face a positive change will 
increase  their  deposits  and  loans  by  less  than  the  lower-capitalized  institutions 
experiencing the same change. A negative coefficient supports the hypothesis, that 
supply factors play a role in lending. 
We control for possible differences in demand factors and macroeconomic effects by 
introducing the following additional variables. The log of total assets (log TAijt-1) 
should control for the impact of the bank’s size on the collection of deposits and the 
extension of loans. This control variable has been found to have a significant impact 
by the empirical literature e.g. Peek and Rosengren (1995a), Ehrmann et al. (2003), 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004). 
We add further a proxy for the liquidity position of the bank, since the balance sheet 
structure with respect to security holdings could influence the lending behavior of 
banks as found in Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004). Since 
                                                            
25   Banks have to establish specific loan loss reserves for expected loan defaults. In contrast, general 
loan loss reserves are accumulated for unknown contingencies. Only the latter are admitted by 
the Basel accord to be counted as tier 2 capital. 
26   A pair wise correlation test gives a correlation of 0.65 between the equity-to-total assets ratio to 
the Basel ratio, a correlation of 0.60 between the extended equity-to-total assets ratio and the 
Basel ratio. The equity-to-total assets ratio and the extended equity-to-total assets ratio have a 
correlation coefficient of 0.92. Each of the corresponding p-values is 0.000.   21
more capitalized banks are typically more liquid, it is necessary to prove that any 
distributional  results  found  are  not  driven  by  the  liquidity  position  instead  of 
capitalization. Liquidity in this context is defined as the ratio of other earning assets 
(bonds and securities) to total assets. 
Banks with large off-balance sheet activities may be better insulated from changes in 
demand than banks that focus on lending. To control for this possibility, we include 
the variable fee incomeijt, which is given by the ratio of other operating income to the 
sum of net interest revenue and other operating income. 
If  demand  conditions  vary  by  size  of  depositor  and  borrower,  we  may  see  very 
different deposit and loan growth rates by size of institutions. We include the growth 
rate of real GDP (∆ log GDPjt) to control for potential effects of the business cycle 
on deposit supply and loan demand. Positive growth should lead to an increase in 
deposit supply and loan demand. As an indicator of monetary policy, we include the 
first difference of a local interest rate (∆ interest ratet). A positive change in the 
interest rate should be followed by a reduction in deposit supply and loan demand. 
As a final macroeconomic variable we included the first difference in the exchange 
rate vis-à-vis the US Dollar. 
Table 7 gives some basic information on what balance sheets look like in the sample. 
The  extended  capitalization  is  on  average  one  percentage  point  higher  than  the 
capitalization given by equity-to-assets ratio. The banks in our sample accumulate 
only less than 20 % of their capital in tier 2 capital components. Comparing the data 
on capital of banks which provide the Basle ratio with the banks which only provide 
equity capital, shows that the group of banks which also publishes Basel ratios is 
very distinct from the average bank in the sample. Banks which publish its Basel 
ratio have 40% more equity capital on their balance sheets than the average bank in 
the sample. Further, they hold on average 7 percentage points excess capital on their 
balance sheets, since the Basel Accord requires banks to hold 8% capital with respect 
to risk-weighted assets. The deposit ratio is higher; they have fewer loans and more 
liquid assets than the average bank. Last but not least, they earn a higher proportion 
of their income with fees than their competitors. 
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Variables/Banks  All banks  Bank with Basel ratio 
Bank without Basel 
ratio 

















































Table 7: Descriptive statistics for the effective sample  
Standard deviations are reported below the means. 
 
 
4.2  Main results 
We have estimated the baseline regressions for each capitalization measure we have 
introduced in section 4.1. The results are presented in Table 8. First, we test the 
simple capital-to-assets ratio, second, we use the extended capital-to-assets ratio and 
last we employ the Basel ratio as capitalization measure. We find for the first two 
sets  of  regressions  that  the  coefficient  on  the  change  of  capital  is  positive  and 
significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the interaction term has a negative 
and significant coefficient which shows that higher capitalized banks show a weaker 
reaction  to  changes  in  capital  than  their  lower  capitalized  counterparts.  These 
specifications thus provide substantial support for the hypothesis that the supply of 
loans is affected by different degrees of capitalization.   23










   deposits    loans    deposits    loans    deposits    loans   
capitalization measure   1.74  ***  1.28  ***  1.21  ***  0.26  ***  0.73  ***  0.08    
   0.23     0.18     0.19     0.12     0.29     0.17    
dK(t)/TA(t-1)  4.87  ***  3.59  ***  4.47  ***  2.75  ***  -1.09     0.28    
   0.64     0.41     0.68     0.44     2.38     1.26    
CM* dK(t)/TA(t-1)  -18.70  ***  -17.41  ***  -14.49  ***  -10.79  ***  5.89     4.04    
   6.87     4.40     6.94     4.47     13.98     7.63    
log TA(t-1)  -0.28  ***  -0.15  ***  -0.33  ***  -0.21  ***  -0.45  ***  -0.19  *** 
   0.02     0.01     0.02     0.01     0.06     0.03    
liquidity(t-1)  -0.29  ***  0.45  ***  -0.30  ***  0.46  ***  -0.67  ***  0.31  *** 
   0.03     0.02     0.03     0.02     0.13     0.07    
fee income  0.05  **  0.01     0.06  ***  0.00     0.26  **  0.16  *** 
   0.03    0.02     0.03    0.02     0.13    0.07    
real GDP growth  0.0100  ***  0.0153  ***  0.0089  ***  0.0147  ***  0.0107  **  0.0120  *** 
   0.0023     0.0015     0.0023     0.0015     0.0063     0.0036    
interest rate change  -0.0079  ***  -0.0039  ***  -0.0073  ***  -0.0037  ***  -0.0053     -0.0041  ** 
   0.0010     0.0006     0.0099     0.0006     0.0039     0.0023    
exchange rate change  -0.0006     0.0007     -0.0007  *  0.0007  ***  -0.0015     -0.0001    
   0.0004     0.0026     0.0004     0.0003     0.0017     0.0009    
constant  1.80  ***  0.75  ***  2.09  ***  1.15  ***  3.39  ***  1.23  *** 
   0.14     0.09     0.12     0.08     0.46     0.24    
R
2 (within)  0.36    0.35    0.36    0.34    0.44    0.37   
Obs  4436    4406    4334    4310    451    458   
Table 8: Results for the baseline regression for all three capitalization measures 
Note: Standard errors are reported below the estimated coefficients. 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
A full set of time dummies is included in each regression. 
 
However, the model predicts that banks are not constrained by capital requirements, 
if they pass a certain degree of capitalization. Our point estimates indicate, that the 
reaction of deposits to changes in capital becomes negative, if the capitalization of 
the bank is greater than 21% percent, the confidence interval for this estimate is 
however  quite  large.  This  means  that  the  majority  of  banks  in  the  EU  countries 
appear to behave as being capital-constrained. Our regression results are comparable 
not only qualitatively but also with respect to the size of coefficients to the estimates 
of Peek and Rosengren (1995a). Depending on the exact specification they find that 
all banks below a capitalization level of 16-21% are constrained and do show loan 
supply reactions after the implementation of the new capital requirements. Chiuri et 
al. (2002) also present regression results that are in accordance with our findings. 
They discover for their panel of emerging economies that the implementation of the   24
Basel Accord in these countries had significantly affected loan supply, particularly at 
less-well capitalized banks. 
The estimation results differ when the Basel ratio is used as capitalization measure. 
Neither the coefficient on the change in capital nor the coefficient of the interaction 
term  is  significantly  different  from  zero.  This  allows  two  interpretations.  If  we 
presume  that  the  Basel  ratio  is  the  more  appropriate  variable  to  measure  the 
regulatory pressure for banks, we have to conclude that deposits and loans are not 
affected by capital changes and the capitalization of the bank does not play a role for 
the behavior of the bank. But as shown above, banks which publish the Basel ratio 
differ from the rest of the sample. These banks are almost three times bigger and 
have about 40% higher equity-to-assets ratio than the rest of the banks in the sample. 
Keeping these facts in mind, we can also deduce from the results that this selected 
group of banks uses the publication of the Basel ratio as a signaling device to inform 
the public about its superior capitalization. In that case, the Basel ratio is of no use to 
measure  regulatory  pressure  at  the  bank  level  and  these  regression  results  are 
seriously biased because of sample selection. 
With regard to the control variables the following results emerge. The coefficient on 
the capitalization measure itself is positive and in five out of six cases significant, 
which means that well-capitalized institutions show faster growth in deposits and 
loans  than  the  average bank.  The  coefficient  a4  is  negative  and  significant  in  all 
regressions of Table 4.8. This shows that both deposits and loans grow at a slower 
pace for larger banks, this results is also confirmed by the analysis of Peek and 
Rosengren  (1995a).  Banks  holding  higher  proportions  of  assets  in  securities  and 
bonds are considered to be more liquid and show a lower growth in deposits and a 
higher growth in loans. This is in accordance with the idea that deposits and liquid 
assets can both serve for funding of new loans. A bank with higher liquidity is not as 
dependent  on  deposits  in  order  to  extend  credit.  Loans  and  liquid  assets  instead 
compete against each other in a portfolio strategy of the bank. The bank manager can 
either invest in securities or extend a new loan. The coefficient on the ratio of fee 
income to fee and interest income is positive in all regressions and significant for the 
deposits  regression.  A  higher  proportion  of  earnings  out  of  off-balance  sheet 
activities has a positive influence on deposit growth. Banks with more diversified 
sources of income are better shielded from negative influences on their income e.g. 
loan  losses.  Real  GDP  growth  and  the  change  in  the  interest  rate  are  important   25
determinants of changes in deposits and loans. Higher overall activity reflected by 
positive real GDP growth has a positive effect on changes in deposits and loans. An 
increase in the interest rate has a negative effect on changes in deposits and loans. 
The change in the exchange rate does not appear to influence the dependent variable. 
 
4.3  Robustness checks 
We  test  the  robustness  of  these  results  in  several  ways.  The  first  test  uses 
capitalization measures from which the respective country average is subtracted. The 
reason for this test is the potential presence of country effects in the capital-to-assets 
ratios  because  of  different  historical  development  or  institutional  features  of  the 
banking sectors in each country. The capitalization measure CM1country is in that 




Capitalization  is  given  by  the  ratio  of  equity  Cijt  over  total  assets  Aijt  minus  the 
average capitalization in country j. The other two capitalization measures are defined 
accordingly. 
However, when the test is performed nothing changes qualitatively. The regression 
results of this first robustness test are presented in the first four columns in Table 9. 
The second robustness check produces regression results with a balanced panel. We 
only use balance sheets of banks, which have contiguous observations in all three 
years of the 1993-1995 sample period. This procedure leaves us with about 1000 
banks. This test is run to ensure that the changing composition of our original sample 
does not bias the regression results. The respective regression results can be found in 
Table 9, columns 5-6. Again, the estimated coefficients do not vary much between 
the two samples, which assures us that the unbalanced sample structure does not 
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Dependent Variable: Change in deposits/total assets or change in loans/total assets 
Robustness test  country effects  continuous sample 
capitalization  extended capitalization  capitalization  Capitalization measure 
(CM)  deposits     loans     deposits     loans     deposits     loans    
capitalization measure   1.63  ***  1.19  ***  1.15  ***  0.24  **  1.63  ***  1.18  *** 
   0.26     0.18     0.19     0.12     0.30     0.20    
dK(t)/TA(t-1)  3.28  ***  2.10  ***  3.14  ***  1.74  ***  4.84  ***  3.72  *** 
   0.27     0.17     0.26     0.17     0.77     0.48    
CM* dK(t)/TA(t-1)  -12.47     -15.16  ***  -7.13     -10.31  *  -18.08  **  -17.64  *** 
   8.40     5.28     8.61     5.50     8.25     5.04    
log TA(t-1)  -0.29  ***  -0.16  ***  -0.33  ***  -0.21  ***  -0.26  ***  -0.13  *** 
   0.02     0.01     0.02     0.01     0.02     0.01    
liquidity(t-1)  -0.29  ***  0.45  ***  -0.30  ***  0.46  ***  -0.28  ***  0.40  *** 
   0.03     0.22     0.03     0.02     0.04     0.03    
fee income  0.05  **  -0.01     0.06  **  -0.0032     0.06  *  -0.0026    
   0.03    0.02     0.03    0.0176     0.03    0.0203    
real GDP growth  0.0110  ***  0.0162  ***  0.0097  ***  0.0154  ***  0.0098  ***  0.0156  *** 
   0.0023     0.0015     0.0023     0.0015     0.0028     0.0017    
interest rate change  -0.0080  ***  -0.0040  ***  -0.0074  ***  -0.0038  ***  -0.0086  ***  -0.0039  *** 
   0.0010     0.0006     0.0010     0.0006     0.0012     0.0007    
exchange rate change  -0.0007  *  0.0006  **  -0.0008  *  0.0006  **  -0.0009  *  0.0006  * 
   0.0004     0.0003     0.0004     0.0003     0.0005     0.0003    
constant  1.94  ***  0.85  ***  2.19  ***  1.17  ***  1.72  ***  0.64  *** 
   0.13     0.08     0.11     0.07     0.17     0.11    
R
2 (within)  0.36     0.35     0.36     0.34     0.37     0.34    
obs  4436     4406     4334     4310     2551     2523    
Table 9: Regression results for the first and second robustness test 
Note: Standard errors are reported below the estimated coefficients. 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
A full set of time dummies is included in each regression. 
 
The third robustness check tries to shed some light on the issue whether we can find 
an announcement effect of the Basel Accord. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
Basel Accord was agreed on in 1988 but only implemented four years later. We so 
far followed Barajas et al. (2004) who argue that the actual implementation year and 
not the announcement date matters for changes in bank behavior. Still, we expect that 
the banking sectors started preparing for the regulation change as soon as they had 
reliable  information  on  the  exact  regulation  outcome.  Gambacorta  and  Mistrulli 
(2004) show that for Italian banks the capital ratios already increased in the period 
that preceded the implementation of the Basel Accord. We run parallel regressions 
for the period 1989-1992 and 1993-1995 with a sample with contiguous observations 
from 1989-1995 to check whether banks’ behavior changed with the implementation 
date.  
   27
Dependent Variable: Change in deposits/total assets or change in loans/total assets 
     
Robustness test  announcement effect 





   deposits     loans     deposits     loans    
capitalization measure   1.30  ***  0.54  **  1.22  **  1.12  *** 
   0.40     0.24     0.15     0.34    
dK(t)/TA(t-1)  3.80  ***  2.94  ***  3.81  **  3.37  *** 
   1.06     0.63     1.56     0.88    
CM* dK(t)/TA(t-1)  -26.40  *  -29.92  ***  -8.74     -22.13  ** 
   14.76     8.61     17.19     9.62    
log TA(t-1)  -0.19  ***  -0.16  ***  -0.23  ***  -0.12  *** 
   0.03     0.02     0.04     0.03    
liquidity(t-1)  -0.17  **  0.35  ***  -0.36  ***  0.34  *** 
   0.07     0.04     0.07     0.05    
fee income  0.10  *  0.00     0.10    0.03    
   0.05    0.03     0.07    0.04    
real GDP growth  0.0005     -0.0009     0.0126  **  0.0163  *** 
   0.0012     0.0007     0.0053     0.0030    
interest rate change  -0.0073  **  -0.0046  **  -0.0143  ***  -0.0073  *** 
   0.0030     0.0019     0.0020     0.0012    
exchange rate change  -0.0067  ***  -0.0022  ***  -0.0039  ***  -0.0009  * 
   0.0013     0.0008     0.0009     0.0005    
constant  1.40  ***  1.04  ***  1.73  ***  0.64  *** 
   0.20     0.13     0.33     0.21    
R
2 (within)  0.25     0.30     0.36     0.36    
obs  1134     1144     865     844    
Table 10: Regression results for the third robustness check 
Note: Standard errors are reported below the estimated coefficients. 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
A full set of time dummies is included in each regression. 
 
We  can  use  the  balance  sheet  information  of  about  350  banks  which  provide 
continuously their balance sheets from 1989-1995. The respective regression results 
are presented in Table 10. 
We find qualitatively the same results.
27 The coefficients on the interaction term in 
the regressions for the early period increase substantially. This means, that banks 
show already in the early period a constrained behavior, but the level of the capital-
to-assets ratio beyond which banks do not react positively to capital changes is much 
lower. Banks with a capital-to-assets ratio above 10% are not constraint by capital 
regulation, the same banks in the later period shows constrained behavior up to a 
capital-to-assets ratio of 15%. We therefore conclude that a fraction of banks in the 
                                                            
27   Since the coefficient on the interaction term for the deposit regressions for the time period 1993-
1995 is not longer significant, the reasoning here refers to the loan regressions.   28
period  before  the  implementation  of  the  Basel  Accord  were  already  constrained, 
possibly preparing for the new regulation, but that the regulatory pressure increased 
with the actual implementation of the new capital regulation.  
The last robustness test tries to verify whether our assumption, that the effects of the 
introduction of the Basel Accord are only transitory, is correct. If this hypothesis is 
correct we should find that the banks in a later sample are either not at all constrained 
or at least a much smaller share of banks should show constrained behavior. This 
would show up in a much higher coefficient for the interaction term. We run two sets 
of regressions, one for the 1993-1995 and one for the 1996-2002 period. We use only 
observations of banks which have contiguous observations for the time period 1993-
2002.  
 
Dependent Variable: Change in deposits/total assets or change in loans/total assets  
Robustness test  transitory effect 





   deposits     loans     deposits     loans    
capitalization measure   2.31  ***  0.85  ***  2.86  ***  1.23  *** 
   0.38     0.25     0.22     0.13    
dK(t)/TA(t-1)  5.78  ***  3.71  ***  10.51  ***  7.77  *** 
   0.91     0.58     0.63     0.37    
CM* dK(t)/TA(t-1)  -23.99  ***  -15.43  ***  -69.75  ***  -48.20  *** 
   9.23     5.93     6.49     3.81    
log TA(t-1)  -0.27  ***  -0.18  ***  -0.03  **  -0.04  *** 
   0.03     0.02     0.01     0.01    
liquidity(t-1)  -0.33  ***  0.47  ***  -0.34  ***  0.05  *** 
   0.05     0.03     0.03     0.02    
fee income  0.99  ***  0.42  *  0.01    0.01    
   0.04    0.03     0.03    0.02    
real GDP growth  0.0040     0.0141  ***  -0.0062  *  -0.0043  * 
   0.0029     0.0019     0.0037     0.0022    
interest rate change  -0.0075  ***  -0.0038  ***  0.0067  ***  0.0070  *** 
   0.0013     0.0009     0.0026     0.0015    
exchange rate change  0.0006     0.0012  ***  0.0000  ***  0.0001  * 
   0.0006     0.0004     0.0000     0.0000    
constant  1.75  ***  0.97  ***  0.21  **  0.26  *** 
   0.21     0.13     0.09     0.05    
R
2 (within)  0.44     0.37     0.52     0.56    
obs  1689     1684     3369     3367    
Table 11: Regression results for the fourth robustness check 
Note: Standard errors are reported below the estimated coefficients. 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
A full set of time dummies is included in each regression. 
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We find that the coefficient on the interaction term is indeed much higher for the 
regressions in period 1996-2002 than for the period 1993-1995. In the three years 
after the implementation only banks with a capital-to-assets ratio above 24% would 
react as unconstrained banks, so effectively all banks behaved as constrained banks. 
In  the  later  period  this  capitalization  level  decreases  substantially  to  15% 
capitalization. All banks above that capital-to-assets ratio are not constrained in any 
way. The respective regression results can be found in Table 11. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Banking  sector  stability  is  a  central  requirement  to  economic  stability.  Bank 
regulation  aims  at  increasing  the  stability  of  banks,  and  thereby  of  financial 
intermediation, since banking crises are associated with high GDP losses. A central 
piece  of  the  Basel  I  regulation  was  to  increase  the  capital-to-assets  ratios  for 
individual banks; Basel II intends to improve on this even further. By increasing 
capital ratios, regulators hope to reduce incentive problems in the banking business. 
In particular, risk taking of banks can be shown to be too high if equity capital 
backing is too low. Thus, regulators intend to stiffen the capital regulation to induce 
banks to improve their capital positions. 
 
The  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  and  Supervision  established  minimum  capital 
requirements for banks in their 1988 Capital Accord. This capital regulation was 
adopted  for  European  Union  banks  at  the  beginning  of  1993.  After  the 
implementation, a widespread concern emerged about the possible negative impact 
that  higher  capital  requirements  could  exert  on  the  level  of  economic  activity, 
especially on bank lending. 
This paper investigates the impact of the Basel Accord on bank deposits and loans 
for eight European countries. We follow the approach taken by Peek and Rosengren 
(1995a)  and  test  for  the  regulatory  effect  in  a  panel  structure  with  about  2500 
individual bank balance sheets for the years 1993-1995. We find that changes in 
deposits are positively correlated with changes in capital. Lower-capitalized banks 
show  a  stronger  response  to  an  increase  in  capital  than  their  higher-capitalized 
competitors. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the implementation   30
of minimum capital requirements has negatively affected the supply of bank loans. 
Further  robustness  checks  indicate  that  our  results  are  neither  affected  by  the 
unbalanced sample structure nor by different country averages in capitalization. In 
addition, we can show with comparative regressions for the periods 1989-1992 and 
1996-2002, that the loan supply effects have been particularly strong in the three 
years after the implementation of the Basel Accord. This evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the implementation of minimum capital requirements could have 
negatively affected the supply of bank loans. This is also in accordance with the 
paper by Barajas et al. (2004) which concludes that Europe was the only region 
where bank lending not only has grown more slowly but has also been shrinking 
after the implementation of 1988 Basel Accord. 
Further  research  is  however  needed  to  assess  the  impact  of  regulation  on  the 
distribution of banks’ capitalization, respectively on the direct behavior of banks. 
The standard approach in the literature, also employed by us, only enable an indirect 
identification  of  the  regulatory  effect  through  the  identification  of  loan  supply 
effects, whose magnitude depend on the level of a bank’s capitalization.   31
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